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BACKGROUND
• The many unofficial and unwritten agreements found throughout West Africa  and the rest of the 
developing world are extremely important but often overlooked.
• These informal contracts  drive the behavior of trading parties (Baker et al. 2002; Brown et al. 2004), 
particularly in informal markets.
• Informal contracts are used extensively for all types of business dealings and involve both business to 
business (B2B) transactions of all sizes and business to consumer (B2C) transactions.
• For example a consumer who always buys from the same street food vendor each day may receive, in 
return for the regular business, additional product or service, while input suppliers  in a B2B situation 
may sell on credit to long term customers.
• In West Africa women street food vendors are a critical component of the informal economy (reference). 
• Kossaï, a deep fat fried fritter made from ground cowpea (known as black-eyed peas in the US), is a 
common product that is purchased daily by consumers of all age, income and cultural groups.
• The production of Kossaï involves multiple stages and is labor intensive.
• In addition to regular interactions (repeat contracts) that the women have with their customers they also 
have regular interactions with input suppliers who sell them the cowpeas and grind the cowpea into a paste 
for batter. 
• Kossaï vendors, use different types of informal contracts to increase the efficiency of their transactions.
• Experimental economics has become an important tool in studying economic behavior such the role of 
incentives on market transaction efficiencies (Duflo, 2005; Levitt and List, 2008).
DATA and EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
•Experimental approach replicates field situations by engaging kossaï vendors and grinders in real market transactions.
•Field experiment employed 64 kossaï vendors in Niamey, Niger in December 2009
•Each vendor engaged in 5 transactions →320 possible trades
•For each transaction the vendor arrived a bit later than usual to have her cowpea ground resulting in a non standard contract
•Each vendor was provided with 100F per transaction to cover the incremental cost associated with the non standard contract. 
•Actions and choices of contractual structures (gift, base fee, discretionary bonus) offered to the grinder were at the discretion of the vendor to permit optimal 
decision making.
•Data collected on variables included types of contracts offered and accepted, quality of service provided by grinder, cost of market transactions and payment 
choices, business and personal characteristics and market operations of kossaï enterprises.  
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RESULTS
• 94% of the rejected contracts were 
discretionary bonus contracts. 
• Discretionary bonus contracts are more 
incomplete
• Transactions under the Discretionary 
Bonus Contract provides discretionary 
latitude for the kossaï vendor to deviate 
from the contract. She pays the grinder 
after quality of service is observed so if 
service is inferior she can renege on 
payment. 
CONCLUSIONS
Kossaï vendors prefer discretionary bonus contracts that are more complete from their perspective. The 
use of this contract enables them to self-enforce high quality of service.
Gift contracts  and standard price contracts are ex-ante efficient but are, however associated with  lower 
quality of service.
Discretionary bonus contracts are ex-post efficient but are associated with low contract acceptance rates.
•Kruskal-Wallis test to test for significant differences in  actual quality and 
average deviation of quality  across contractual structures. 
•The difference in quality is statistically significant between the DBC and  SP, 
between  DBC and  GC  as well as between the pooled SP/GC ad DBC. There is no 
evidence that qSP> qGC. This may be because  GC and SP are similar in structure  
and provides the grinder with discretionary latitude to deviate from the contract.
•These results are consistent for test for differences in the average deviation 
across the  different contractual structures.
PROBLEM
Grinding of the cowpeas is a 
Critical Stage in Kossaï Production
Potential Hold up Problem
An informal contract exists for every 
woman vendor/grinder combination as a 
result of their regular interaction.
Initial observations indicate that kossaï vendors 
use different contractual structures to motivate 
trade efficiency in their transactions with grinders.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this paper is to test the ex-ante and ex-post 
efficiencies of the different contractual structures using 
field experiments in market transactions between kossaï 
vendors and the grinders (their key input suppliers).
Methodology
Type of Contracts:
Gift Contracts are equivalent to an up-front payment or “tip”  over an above the base fee that the woman vendor pays the grinder to secure 
the services to have her cowpea ground that day.
Standard Pricing Contract is the common, widely known fixed fee that the grinder charges to grind a given amount of cowpea.
Discretionary Bonus Contracts involve a deferred payment of the base fee plus a bonus. This total amount is paid at the end of the day after 
the vendor has received revenue from her sales.
Ex-ante Efficiency is measured by contract acceptance rates.   Ex-post Efficiency is measured by the actual quality of service received
Discretionary Bonus Contract
(DBC)
Standard Pricing Contract (SP) Gift Contract (GC)
Nature of Contract Most  Incomplete More Complete More Complete
Contract Efficiency Ex-post Efficient Ex-ante Efficient Ex-ante Efficient
Table 2: Contract Offers and Acceptances Rates
Number of Contracts 
Offered (% of total)
Number of Contracts 
Accepted (% of total)
Gift contract (GC) 54 (17%) 52  (18%)
Standard Price 
contract  (SP)




Total Number of 
Possible Trades 320 288
[1] The gift contract is the most “complete” of the incomplete contracts as it leaves the seller – grinder with discretionary latitude on quality but fully enforces the vendor’s obligations. Fixed price + tip (most complete/ payment before service).
[2] This contract is similar to the gift contract but does not include an upfront bonus component. Fixed price (conditionally complete/ payment before service).









































































































Gift Contract 52 2.65 2.10 0.56 28 53.85%
Standard Price 
Contract 134 2.66 2.25 0.42 62 46.27%
Discretionary Bonus 
Contract 134 2.76 2.91 -0.15 6 4.48%







































Avg. Contracted Quality, Q
Avg. Actual Quality, q
Table 5: Differences in Percentages of Actual Quality, q across contractual 
structures
Hypothesis: H0: qDBC > qGC
Hypothesis: H0: qDBC> qGC
P-Value Chi-Square
H0: qDBC = qSP <0.0001 84.93***
H0: qSP = qGC 0.22 1.49
H0: qDBC = qGC <0.0001 70.88***
H0: qPOOLED_SP GC = qDBC <0.0001 97.45***
***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
Table 6: Differences in Percentages of Average Deviation (Q-q) across 
contractual structures.
Hypothesis: H0: Q-qGC > Q-qDBC
Hypothesis: H0: Q-qGC> Q-qDBC
P-Value Chi-Square
H0: Q-qGC=Q-qSP 0.3 1.06
H0: Q-qSP = Q-qDBC <0.0001 49.62***
H0: Q-qGC=Q-qDBC <0.0001 35.37***
H0: qPOOLED_SP GC = qDBC <0.0001 57.92***
***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
Hypotheses and Expected Results
H1:  Gift Contracts are more ex-ante efficient (i.e. they are good at motivating contract acceptance because this contract provides up-front credibility and guarantees the return to the grinder)
H2: Discretionary Bonus Contracts are more ex-post efficient (i.e. they are good at inducing high quality service because the grinder will not receive the payment until after the grinding service is provided and the quality of service is observed by the vendor)
H2a: Average contracted quality should be higher under Discretionary Bonus Contract than Standard Price Contract or Gift Contract 
H2b: Seller deviation from contracted quality should be smaller under Discretionary Bonus Contract  than the Standard Price Contract or Gift Contract 
Figure 1: Percentage of Contracts Offered
Kossai vendors prefer discretionary bonus contracts (51% of contracts 
offered) which are more complete from their perspective. 
- Contracts that are more complete in nature (gift contract and standard price 
contract) are ex-ante efficient, that is, they are good at motivating contract 
acceptance.
- We observe relatively higher contract acceptance rates under the gift contract 
and standard price contract (96% and 100% respectively) in comparison to the 
discretionary bonus contract.
Figure 2: Percentage of Specific Contracts Offered that were Accepted
Figure 3: Percentage of Total Number of Rejected Contracts
•Average actual quality is highest under DBC, followed by SP and then 
GC.  Discretionary bonus contracts are more ex-post efficient , that is, 
they are good at inducing high quality of service.
•Increasing the degree of contractual incompleteness permits the 
vendor to self-enforce the grinder to deliver high quality of service.
b) Ex-Post Efficient Contractual Structures a) Ex-Ante Efficient  Contractual Structures
Figure 3: Average Levels of Contracted Quality and Actual Quality
A typical grinder
Women street food vendors waiting in line for service from grinder
Quality of service is defined by the degree of homogeneity of the ground cowpea batter and the level of 
contamination with other products (e.g. millet, sorghum). In this research this is measured as the women’s 
perception.  Contracted quality is the expected quality while actual quality is what they experienced.